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Waiver of Sovereign Immunity: An Analysis
of Gilbert v. Richardson

In Gilbert v. Richardson,' the Georgia Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether a county waives its sovereign immunity by purchasing
liability insurance.' On September 1, 1991, Deputy Kathy Richardson
responded to an emergency call and collided with Emma and Tommy
Gilbert's vehicle. Both Gilberts were injured. The Gilberts brought suit
against the Walker County Sheriff's Department, the sheriff, and a
deputy sheriff. Plaintiffs alleged that Sheriff Millard, as the employer
of the deputy sheriff, was liable for the acts of the deputy while she was
acting within the course of her employment.' Walker County's Georgia
Interlocal Risk Management Association ("GIRMA") coverage agreement
protected the county against motor vehicle liability.4 Through GIRMA,
participating counties jointly purchase general liability, motor vehicle
The trial court granted
liability, or property damage insurance.'
judgment. The court
summary
for
motion
Richardson's and Millard's
did not waive the
in
GIRMA
participation
held that Walker County's
immunity.6
official
sheriff's
deputy
the
or
immunity
sheriff's sovereign
7 The Georgia Supreme Court granted
The court of appeals affirmed.
certiorari to determine if the doctrines of sovereign and official immunity
barred the action against two Walker County officials.8 The court held
that official immunity barred the claims against Deputy Richardson but
that the county and Sheriff Millard were liable to the extent of
insurance

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).
Id. at 751, 452 S.E.2d at 481.
Id. at 745, 452 S.E.2d at 478.
Id. at 751 n.8, 452 S.E.2d at 482 n.8.
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-85-2(a) (1993)).
Id. at 745, 452 S.E.2d at 477.
Id. (citing Gilbert v. Richardson, 211 Ga. App. 795, 440 S.E.2d 684 (1994)).
Id. at 744, 452 S.E.2d at 478.
Id. at 752-53, 452 S.E.2d at 482-83.
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At the time of the American Revolution, sovereign immunity was a
well-established doctrine in England's common law.'0 By an act of the
General Assembly on February 25, 1784, Georgia adopted England's
common law, including its doctrine of sovereign immunity." A 1974
amendment to the Georgia Constitution authorized the General
Assembly to create a state court of claims to exercise jurisdiction over
personal injury or property damage claims against the State of
Georgia. 2 The provisionfor a state court of claims did not constitute a
waiver of sovereign immunity; therefore, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity continued to protect the state and its entities." In the 1980
case fof Hennessy v. Webb,"' the court held there was no question that
sovereign immunity extended to the governmental unity itself: "The
issue in this case was whether this immunity extended to an agent of
the board' carrying out its duties to provide public education by
exercising custody and control over the school premises." 5 In Hennessy
a student slipped on a rug; the school principal was allegedly negligent
for allowing a rug and mat to be in front of the door.'" The court
upheld the common law rule that the nature of the public officials' acts
determine whether an official is personally liable. 7 The court explained that officials, "invested with discretion and ... empowered to
exercise [their] judgment" to perform their duties, are immune from
liability provided the officers acted within the scope of their authority
and "without willfulness, malice, or corruption."" However, public
officials are not immune when they fail to perform purely ministerial
duties required by law.' According to the facts, "[dlefendant [was]
alleged to have allowed a condition to exist which he knew or should

10. Crowder v. Department of State Parks, 228 Ga. 436, 439, 185 S.E.2d 908, 911
(1971).
11. Id.

12. 264 Ga. at 745, 452 S.E.2d at 478 (citing 1973 Ga. Laws 1489).
13. 1973 Ga. Laws at 1490. "Nothing contained herein shall constitute a waiver of the
immunity of the state from suit, but such sovereign immunity is expressly reserved except

to the extent of any waiver of immunity provided in this Constitution and such waiver or
qualification of immunity as is now or may hereafter be provided by act of the General
Assembly." 1973 Ga. Laws 1489-90. The amendment was ratified in the 1974 General

Election. 264 Ga. at 746 n.2, 452 S.E.2d at 478 n.2.
14. 245 Ga. 329, 264 S.E.2d 878 (1980).
15. Id. at 331, 264 S.E.2d at 879.

16. Id.
17. Id. at 329, 452 S.E.2d at 878.
18. Id. at 331, 452 S.E.2d at 880. See Vickers v. Motte, 109 Ga. App. 615, 618, 137
S.E.2d 77, 79 (1964) (Board of education was not liable for selecting a dangerous school bus

route because the decision was a governmental act).
19. 245 Ga. at 331, 452 S.E.2d at 880.
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have known was hazardous. This... is an allegation that he negligently exercised his authorized discretion."" Plaintiffs did not allege the
defendant acted wilfully or outside the scope of his authority.2 '
Therefore, the court held that the board of education and the school
principal were protected from liability under the doctrine of governmental immunity.22 The General Assembly finally modified sovereign
immunity in 1982. Under the constitutional amendment, the state
and the departments and agencies of the state waive sovereign immunity
to the extent of liability insurance.2 4 ' In Martin v. GeorgiaDepartment
of Public Safety,25 the supreme court construed the amendment and
held that the police department and its officers were liable to the extent
of liability insurance.26 The insurance waived the officers' official
immunity and the police department's sovereign immunity against
vicarious liability for the acts of its employees. In 1987, the General
Assembly proposed another amendment "provid[ing] for the purchase of
liability insurance protection for state officers and employees to protect
them from personal liability arising from the performance of the duties
of their office or employment ...

[without] waiv[ing] the defense of

sovereign immunity or the defense of official immunity."2' Voters
defeated the amendment; thus, state officers and employees could not
assert their official immunity against claims that were covered under
liability insurance.'
In 1990, voters ratified an amendment that
vested the General Assembly with the exclusive right to waive sovereign
immunity by an act specifically providing for waiver and the extent of

20. Id. at 332, 452 S.E.2d at 880.
21. Id.
22. Id., 452 S.E.2d at 881.
23. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9 editor's note (1983). The amendment was proposed
at 1982 Ga. Laws 2546 and ratified that same year:
Sovereign immunity extends to the state and all of its departments and agencies
....
Also the defense of sovereign immunity is waived as to those actions for the
recovery of damages for any claim against the state or any of its departments and
agencies for which liability insurance protection for such claims has been provided
but only to the extent of any liability insurance provided. Moreover, the sovereign
immunity of the state or any of its departments and agencies may hereafter be
waived further by Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides that
sovereign immunity is hereby waived and the extent of the waiver.
1982 Ga. Laws 2546.
24. GA. CONsT. art. I, § 2, para. 9 editor's note (1983).
25. 257 Ga. 300, 357 S.E.2d 569 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 998 (1988).
26. 257 Ga. at 301, 357 S.E.2d at 571.
27. Id. at 303, 357 S.E.2d at 572.
28. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9. The amendmeht was defeated in the November 8,
1988 general election. 1988 Ga. Laws 2121, 2128.
29. 1988 Ga. Laws 2121, 2128.
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such waiver.3 0 The General Assembly exercised its right and waived
the state's sovereign immunity against the tort actions specified in the
Georgia Torts Claim Act.31 The Act lists twelve exceptions to state
liability.32 Among these exceptions, the state shall not be liable for the
acts or omissions of its employees while performing discretionary
functions.3 3 The Act contains a detailed statement of legislative
intent.3' The General Assembly explained that, unlike private entrepreneurs who voluntarily engage in activities, the state must provide
certain services to the public.36 Consequently, the state involuntarily
faces certain liability exposures. 6 The General Assembly further
explained that "state officers and employees [must] be free to act and to
make decisions, in good faith, without fear of thereby exposing themselves to lawsuits and without fear of the loss of their personal
assets."37 Therefore, sovereign immunity was the general rule and
state liability became a limited exception.
In Gilbert v. Richardson,5 the supreme court affirmed the trial
court's ruling that official immunity barred all claims against Deputy
Richardson, but the court reversed the trial court's ruling that sovereign
immunity barred claims against the sheriff.39 The court explained that
official immunity protects governmental officers and employees.40 The
court interpreted the 1991 amendment to provide governmental officers
and employees with immunity from personal liability when they
negligently perform discretionary acts.41 Such employees work in
positions that require them to make policy decisions or exercise
discretion. 2 The employees are not, however, immune from "ministerial [nondiscretionary] acts negligently performed or for ministerial or

30. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9 (1990 Ga. Laws 2435, § 1).
31. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-21 (1991).
32. Id. § 50-21-24.
33. Id. § 50-21-24(2) (1994). 'The state shall have no liability for losses resulting from
..(2) [tjhe exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a state officer or employee, whether or not the discretion
involved is abused." Id.
34. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-22 (1994).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476.
39. Id. at 748, 452 S.E.2d at 480 (with all justices concurring, except Hunt, C.J., who
concurred in judgment only).
40. Id. at 749-50, 452 S.E.2d at 481.
41. Id. at 752, 452 S.E.2d at 483.
42. Id.
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discretionary acts performed with malice or an intent to injure."" The
court concluded that Deputy Richardson was exercising a discretionary
function when she responded to the emergency call and, therefore, was
immune from liability." Thus, the court interpreted the 1991 amendment to subject "state officers and employees and those of its departments and agencies ...

to suit only when they negligently perform or

fail to perform their 'ministerial functions' or when they act with actual
malice or intent to cause injury in the performance of their 'official
functions."'45 The court found that the 1991 amendment also granted
sovereign immunity to counties." The court explained that the 1983
amendment had effectively granted sovereign immunity to counties, as
departments or agencies of the state; thus, the virtually identical
language in the 1991 amendment continued to extend sovereign
immunity to counties.4 7 However, Walker County waived its sovereign
immunity to the extent of liability insurance." Sheriff Millard argued
that the insurance did not waive the county's sovereign immunity; he
contended that the Georgia Tort Claims Act was the exclusive way for
the General Assembly to waive sovereign immunity.49 The court
rejected this argument and held that the language of the amendment did
not restrict the General Assembly's authority to waive sovereign
immunity by other means.5 " The court agreed with the court in Curtis
v. Board of Regents51 that the legislature enacted the 1991 amendment
and the Georgia Tort Claims Act to "redefine the terms of the state's
waiver of sovereign immunity, rather than withdraw the existing
waiver."52 The court found that a prior act which waived a county's
"governmental immunity" to the extent of motor vehicle insurance
remained effective after the passage of the 1991 amendment. 53 Thus,
the sovereign immunity of the state and its departments and agencies
can only be waived by an act of the General Assembly, but waiver is

43. Id. at 753, 452 S.E.2d at 483.
44. Id.
45. Id at 752-53, 452 S.E.2d at 483. Official functions are acts "performed within the
officer's or employee's scope of authority, including both ministerial and discretionary acts."
Id at 753, 452 S.E.2d at 483.
46. Id. at 747, 452 S.E.2d at 479.
47. Id. at 747-48, 452 S.E.2d at 479-80.
48. Id. at 754, 452 S.E.2d at 484.
49. Id. at 747, 452 S.E.2d at 479.
50. Id. at 748, 452 S.E.2d at 480.
51. 262 Ga. 226, 416 S.E.2d 510 (1992).
52. 1d. (citing Curtis v. Board of Regents, 262 Ga. 226, 227-28, 416 S.E.2d 510, 512
(1992)).
53. 264 Ga. at 748 n.6, 452 S.E.2d at 480 n.56.
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achieved by any act which specifically provides that sovereign immunity
is thereby waived and the extent of such waiver." The court explained
that section 33-24-51(b) "provides both a waiver of sovereign immunity
[by motor vehicle insurance] and the extent of such waiver and is,
therefore, a legislative act waiving sovereign immunity as contemplated
by the 1991 amendment."5 Accordingly, the county's purchase of
insurance waived sovereign immunity." The court carefully explained
that the county's insurance waived only governmental immunity, which
is "synonymous with sovereign immunity and not an umbrella term
encompassing both sovereign and official immunity."5 7 The court
approved the numerous cases that have used the term "governmental
immunity" as a synonym for "sovereign immunity."8 Therefore, the
insurance coverage did not waive the official immunity that barred the
claims against Deputy Richardson, but the insurance did waive the
county and the sheriff's sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance. 9 The court ultimately held Sheriff Millard personally liable for
the injuries sustained by the Gilberts.'
In Woodard u. Laurens County,61 the court relied on its prior conclusion in Gilbert and again held that the 1991 constitutional amendment
"provides no official immunity defense for ministerial acts negligently
performed or for ministerial or discretionary acts performed with malice
or an intent to injure. It, however, does provide immunity for the
negligent performance of discretionary acts."62 In Woodard, appellants
filed suit against "five county commissioners in their official capacities
and two county employees in both their official and individual capacities.'
Appellants alleged that the county employees negligently
inspected and maintained a stop sign that had become obscured by tree
limbs. The county officers exercised discretion when they implemented

54. Id. at 747-48, 452 S.E.2d at 479-80.
55. Id. at 751, 452 S.E.2d at 481-82.
56. Id., 452 S.E.2d at 481.
57. Id. at 750, 452 S.E.2d at 481.
58. Id at 749,452 S.E.2d at 480. See Hiers v. City of Barwick, 262 Ga. 129,414 S.E.2d
647 (1992); Thigpen v. McDuffle County Bd. of Educ., 255 Ga. 59, 335 S.E.2d 112 (1985);

Hennessy v. Webb, 245 Ga. 329, 264 S.E.2d 878 (1980); Knowles v. Housing Auth. of
Columbus, 212 Ga. 729, 95 S.E.2d 659 (1956); Roberts v. Barwick, 187 Ga. 691, 1 S.E.2d
713 (1939); Schmidt v. Adams, 211 Ga. App. 156, 438 S.E.2d 659 (1993); Culberson v.
Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 201 Ga. App. 347,411 S.E.2d 754 (1991); Dekalb County Sch.
Dist. v. Bowden, 177 Ga. App. 296, 339 S.E.2d 356 (1985).

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

264 Ga. at 754, 452 S.E.2d at 484.
Id.
265 Ga. 404, 456 S.E.2d 581 (1995).
Id. at 406, 456 S.E.2d at 583.
Id. at 404, 456 S.E.2d at 582.
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inspection and maintenance procedures." Official immunity barred
claims against the officers unless their acts were "wilful, malicious, or
corrupt.
Therefore, the officers were entitled to summary judgment." Next, the court addressed sovereign immunity. 7 Following
Gilbert, the issue of whether a county waived its sovereign immunity
against any claim covered by liability insurance remained unsettled.
The Georgia Supreme Court resolved this issue in Woodard." The
court held that the statute waived "[a] county's sovereign immunity...
but only 'to the extent of the amount of liability insurance purchased for
the negligence of [county] officers, agents, servants, attorneys, or
employees arising from the use of a motor vehicle.' 69 Unlike Gilbert,
liability of the county officers is "not predicated upon their alleged
negligent use of an insured motor vehicle."70 Thus, sovereign immunity
was a viable defense to appellants' claims.71 In Woodard, the court
held that O.C.G.A. section 33-24-51(b) waives a county's sovereign
immunity to the extent of motor vehicle liability insurance.72 The court
explained that "because the liability of appellees [wals not predicated
upon their alleged negligent use of an insured motor vehicle[,] [lit follows
that ...

sovereign immunity has not been waived by the General

Assembly and remains a viable defense to appellants' claims." 3
Although Laurens County had insurance, sovereign immunity protected
the county against a claim that it negligently maintained an obscured
stop sign. 4 Similarly, sovereign immunity will continue to protect
counties and county employees against many claims that are covered by
liability insurance. The court's interpretation of the 1991 amendment
is consistent with the General Assembly's recognition that sovereign
immunity should protect the state from certain liabilities because the
state must provide certain services to the public and does not voluntarily
assume these risks. The court's interpretation of the 1991 amendment
is also consistent with the General Assembly's recognition that county

64. Id. at 407, 456 S.E.2d at 584.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. I& at 405, 456 S.E.2d at 582.
68. Id.
69. Id., 456 S.E.2d at 582-83 (quoting Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 749, 452 S.E.2d at 480)
(emphasis in original).
70. Id., 456 S.E.2d at 583.
71. Id.
72. Id., 456 S.E.2d at 582.
73. Id., 456 S.E.2d at 583.
74. Id., 456 S.E.2d at 582-83.
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officers and employees must be free to act and to make decisions, in good
faith, without fear of losing their assets.
SUSAN HURT

